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 3 
BORDER CONTROLS, SURVEILLANCE AND COUNTER 
TERRORISM 
 
1. Introduction 
One of the most commonly repeated statements regarding international law 
on border controls and migration is that of the European Court of Human 
Rights: ‘The Court reiterates that Contracting States have the right as a mat-
ter of well-established international law and subject to their treaty obliga-
tions, including the Convention, to control the entry, residence and expulsion 
of aliens’.1 The extent of the right to control entry and the limits which may 
be placed on that right is the subject which I examine here. In the jurispru-
dence of the European Court of Human Rights and elsewhere, the limits of 
state action in respect of border controls on persons is limited by the human 
rights obligations which states have ratified. This means that when examining 
states’ border control activities, the human right to seek asylum, non-
refoulement and the right to respect for private and family life are the points 
of departure against which states’ practices and law are tested. States are 
rarely required to justify the reasons for their border control laws and prac-
tices beyond the human rights limits. Where they are, the answer is usually 
one of state sovereignty which permits the exercise of border controls in the 
interests of national security (though there are others perspectives).2 Until 
recently this claim to national security was accepted with little investigation. 
Recent case law from the Court of Justice of the European Union (on the pro-
posed EU-Canada PNR Agreement) and the US courts (on the Executive Order 
No 13780 and its predecessors barring from entry to the USA nationals of 
certain countries) appear to be changing this status quo. The working paper 
sets out the issue of border control and personal data collection in pursuit of 
counter-terrorism objectives, the challenges which are presented for the 
right to privacy and the recent developments in the form of the CJEU’s Opin-
ion on the proposed EU Canada PNR Agreement3 and very briefly, the chal-
lenge of the US 9th Circuit Appeal Court to the claim of the US Government in 
defence of its executive order protecting the nation from foreign terrorist 
entry into the United States that national security trumps all other constitu-
tional claims. 
                                                  
1  D. v. the United Kingdom. 2 May 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-III. 
2  Bauder, Harald. Migration Borders Freedom. Vol. 63. Taylor & Francis, 2016. 
3  EU:C:2017:592. 
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2. Who is coming to your country?  
Interest in knowing who the foreigners are who are arriving at national bor-
ders has been a matter of substantial interest to many countries, not least in 
Europe and the USA. While visa requirements provide a tool to ensure that all 
nationals of some countries must undergo a pre-travel clearance check (in 
the form of a visa application and determination), many states have not been 
satisfied with this tool. Some, like the USA, have introduced advanced au-
thorisation systems for all foreign traveller to their country (the Electronic 
System from Travel Authorization, ESTA). The EU is currently considering leg-
islating for a similar system. These systems provide advanced information 
about all foreign travellers and as has become apparent with the endless ad-
dition of questions to ESTA application forms, can be quick flexible.  
To be successful, these systems must be accompanied by carrier sanc-
tions which penalise transport companies for transporting passengers with-
out visas or other prior authorisation.4  
But these information sources, visas, ESTAs etc, do not provide a full pic-
ture of all passengers travelling to a country. They are limited to foreigners. 
Many countries wish to have complete information about all arriving passen-
gers, including their own nationals who are returning. This information is 
available from the airlines in a number of forms, first: advance passenger in-
formation (API). This is information from carriers records about all passengers 
on each flight, train or ship which is sent to the destination country within 
specified periods before departure.5 According to the International Air Trans-
port Association (IATA) 39 countries require airlines to send API before a 
flights arrival. The USA first required this data to be provided by legislation in 
1991.6 Other states followed suit. A further 32 countries are planning to in-
troduce this requirement.7 API consists of the information held in the ma-
chine readable zone of passports and details of the travel. IATA is seeking 
that all countries which demand API information harmonise their require-
                                                  
4  Walters, William. ‘Border/control’. In: Amelina, Anna, Horvath, Kenneth, Meeus, Bruno 
(Eds.) An Anthology of Migration and Social Transformation. Springer International 
Publishing, 2016, p. 151-165; Scholten, Sophie, and Paul Minderhoud. ‘Regulating im-
migration control: Carrier sanctions in the Netherlands.’ European Journal of Migration 
and Law 10.2 (2008): 123-147. 
5  API data required for instance under EU Directive 2004/82 requires only: the number 
and type of travel document used; nationality; full names; date of birth; border cross-
ing point of entry; code of transport; departure and arrival time of the transportation; 
total number of passengers carried on the transport; initial point of embarkation.  
6  49 U.S. Code § 44909 — Passenger manifests. 
7  http://www.iata.org/whatwedo/passenger/data/Pages/index.aspx, accessed 20 Sep-
tember 2017. 
Nijmegen Migration Law Working Papers Series: 2017/03 
5 
ments to ‘international standards and guidelines.’ This indicates that there is 
not or at least not yet a harmonised norm. API was given a specific interna-
tional status by Security Council Resolution 2178 of 24 September 2014 
which calls on all states to counter and prevent the movement of terrorist 
foreign fighters8 including by providing advance passenger information to 
countries which request this.9 
A number of countries, however, have not been satisfied with this source 
of information about who is coming to their borders. These countries created 
obligations on travel companies and airlines to make available to them an-
other source of information created by the private sector to simplify com-
mercial activities of travel related businesses: passenger name records (PNR). 
PNR files are an industry wide customer information system, created and 
stored on all passengers who contract with transport (and other) companies. 
This data includes both foreigners and citizens, a distinction which is of only 
marginal interest to travel companies but of great importance to states. Ac-
cording to IATA, six countries currently require PNR data to be made available 
to them on all passengers travelling to their country and a further 30 coun-
tries are developing or considering implementing such a requirement.10  
3. Passenger Name Records 
Passenger name records (PNR) are files created by carriers (normally airlines, 
train, bus and shipping companies) regarding all passengers whom they carry 
which contain all information necessary for the processing and control of res-
ervations. PNR data includes a much wider range of data than API. It includes 
information such as the name of the passenger, travel dates, itineraries, 
seats, meal preferences, fidelity cards, all passengers booking together, spe-
                                                  
8  Paragraph 2: ‘that all States shall prevent the movement of terrorists or terrorist 
groups by effective border controls and controls on issuance of identity papers and 
travel documents, and through measures for preventing counterfeiting…’, Security 
Council Resolution 2178 of 24 September 2014 
9  Paragraph 9 ‘Calls upon Member States to require that airlines operating in their terri-
tories provide advance passenger information to the appropriate national authorities 
in order to detect the departure from their territories, or attempted entry into or tran-
sit through their territories, by means of civil aircraft, of individuals designated by the 
Committee established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999)and 1989 (2011) (‘the 
Committee’), and further calls upon Member States to report any such departure from 
their territories, or such attempted entry into or transit through their territories, of 
such individuals to the Committee, as well as sharing this information with the State of 
residence or nationality, as appropriate and in accordance with domestic law and in-
ternational obligations;’ Security Council Resolution 2178 of 24 September 2014 
10  http://www.iata.org/whatwedo/passenger/data/Pages/index.aspx, accessed 20 Sep-
tember 2017. 
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cial requirements such as wheelchairs, baggage, contact details, addresses, 
phone numbers including mobile numbers and means of payment. As such 
PNR data is much more sensitive than its API counterpart as it contains in-
formation which is much more intrusive into the lives of the individuals who 
provide it. From special needs, information about health can be deduced. 
From information about meal preferences (such as Halal) assumptions about 
religion can be made. From payment methods, relationships with third par-
ties, such as companies paying for travel of passengers can be discovered. 
As some states have become increasing concerned about the possible 
convergence of border crossing and terrorism risks (in particular after the 
attacks in the USA on 11 September 2001), interior ministries led by the US 
Department of Homeland Security sought ways to obtain ever more accurate 
and detailed information about passengers. PNR became of interest to state 
authorities. Generally, states’ collection and use of vast amounts of personal 
data as a solution to the risk of terrorism intensified after 2001 to the point 
where the US whistleblower, Edward Snowden, revealed an astonishing net-
work of public and private tools used by US (and other) intelligence services 
to collect electronic data in bulk.11 The border as a data collection site where 
people are relatively vulnerable – not yet admitted to a state (even if it is 
their own) – and so in a grey zone regarding constitutional protections12 be-
came interesting to some state authorities in the pursuit of counter terrorism 
objectives.13 What was the advantage, in that framework of PNR data? 
While API contains information which states have placed in their citizens’ 
passports and the individual’s travel itinerary as known by the travel com-
pany, PNR files are more extensive. They are created on the basis of the con-
tract between the individual and the travel company and sensitive both as to 
the elements of the private life of the individual and as regards commercially 
sensitive information for the company. Travel companies were unwilling to 
provide this information to state authorities without specific legislation re-
quiring them to do so. The first country to so legislate was the USA in 2002.14 
The purpose of US legislation requiring access to PNR files is the fight against 
                                                  
11  Bauman, Zygmunt, et al. ‘After Snowden: Rethinking the impact of surveil-
lance.’ International political sociology 8.2 (2014): 121-144. 
12  Neuman, Gerald L. Strangers to the constitution: Immigrants, borders, and fundamen-
tal law. Princeton University Press, 2010. 
13  Guild, Elspeth, ‘Who is Sharing Personal Data Obtained in Immigration Procedures with 
Whom?’ Immigration Law Practitioners Association European Update, September 
2014. 
14  The Federal Register/Vol. 67, No. 122/Tuesday, June 25, 2002/Rules and Regulations 
permits the sharing of this data. 
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terrorism and serious crime.15 However, many were critical about the com-
patibility of the right to privacy with the sharing PNR files (which result from 
information which customers provide to a private company) with state au-
thorities. The privacy issue became explicit fairly quickly following the adop-
tion of the US legislation as travel companies subject to the jurisdiction of EU 
states found themselves between a rock and a hard place.16 Either they 
flouted US legislation and refused to provide PNR data to the US or they pro-
vide it and breach EU privacy law.  
Thus the need for PNR agreements arises from privacy protection legisla-
tion in many countries, such as the Member States of the European Union.17 
By 2003 discussions were taking place between the EU and the USA on PNR 
transfers from the EU to the USA which resulted in the first EU-US PNR 
Agreement in 2004.18 
In fact, most airlines do not host their own databases for PNR. Instead 
they store PNR in a Computerized Reservation System (or Global Distribution 
Systems) which are operated by three companies – Amadeus (registered in 
Spain), SABRE (listed on the US NASDAC exchange) and Travelport (which is 
comprised of Galileo and Worldspan and listed on the NY Stock Exchange as a 
US company). Because PNR is a tool of the travel industry, it links data on cus-
tomers such as hotel bookings, car hire etc but also information useful to 
staff such as comments on customers.19  
4. The EU and PNR Agreements with third countries 
The EU has been active in the field of transfer of PNR data. The first agree-
ment with the USA in 2004 was followed by a second agreement with Canada 
in 2006 and  an agreement with Australia in 2008. All these agreements were 
time limited. None has been uncontroversial. Each agreement requires the 
European Commission to issue an adequacy decision regarding the comple-
mentarity of the agreement with the EU’s data protection regime contained 
                                                  
15  Rasmussen, D. Richard. ‘Is International Travel Per Se Suspicion of Terrorism-The Dis-
pute between the United States and European Union over Passenger Name Record 
Data Transfers.’ Wis. Int'l LJ 26 (2008): 551. 
16  Argomaniz, Javier. ‘When the EU is the ‘Norm‐taker’: The Passenger Name Records 
Agreement and the EU’s Internalization of US Border Security Norms.’ European Inte-
gration 31.1 (2009): 119-136. 
17  http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/international-transfers/pnr-tftp/ pnr-and-
tftp_en.htm accessed 18 September 2017.  
18  Mendez, Mario. ‘Passenger Name Record Agreement-European Court of Jus-
tice.’ European Constitutional Law Review 3.1 (2007): 127. 
19  ICAO, Guidelines on Passenger Name Record (PNR) Data First Edition 2010 Doc 9944; E 
Hasbrouck, ‘What is a Passenger Name Record?’, https://hasbrouck.org/articles/PNR. 
html, accessed 18 September 2017. 
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in (the then applicable) Directive 95/46.20 Each time there has been concern 
and opposition regarding the (lack of adequate) protection of EU citizens’ 
privacy provided by the non EU party concerning the use of the data. This 
resistance has come in the form of negative opinions from the EU’s Article 29 
Working Party (established under the Directive and composed of a represen-
tative of the data protection authority of each Member State, the European 
Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) and the Commission), annulment actions 
by the European Parliament before the Court of Justice of the European Un-
ion and civil society.21 
Revelations about the US National Security Agency’s (NSA) mass surveil-
lance programmes by Edward Snowden in 2013 generated substantial con-
cern in the field of privacy protection.22 Nowhere was this more pronounced 
that in the EU. A series of judgments by the CJEU in respect of privacy protec-
tion has left a number of EU agreements with third countries regarding data 
sharing in doubt.23 
What is particularly interesting of PNR agreements is that states under-
take to allow the transmission of personal data of people (the majority of 
whom are likely to be their citizens) to another country for the purposes of 
fighting terrorism and serious transnational crime. The personal data includes 
a wide range of elements, has been collected by the private sector on the 
basis of the contractual arrangements which each business in the sector 
agrees with the customer and are covered by consumer protection rights. In 
the EU such personal data is protected by Directive 95/46 which is in the 
process of being replaced by a much more onerous set of rules protecting 
privacy and personal data under the General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR) which must be in effect in the 28 Member States by 25 May 2018.24 
The GDPR tightens up controls and obligations on the private sector in re-
spect of the collection, use, transmission (or other sharing) and deletion of 
personal data and includes the so-called ‘right to be forgotten’. For the public 
sector, the Data Protection Directive on the protection of natural persons 
with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for 
                                                  
20  Brouwer, Evelien. The EU Passenger Name Record (PNR) System and Human Rights: 
Transferring Passenger Data or Passenger Freedom? CEPS Working Document No. 320. 
Brussels: CEPS 2009. 
21  Fahey, Elaine. ‘Law and Governance as Checks and Balances in Transatlantic Security: 
Rights, Redress, and Remedies in EU-US Passenger Name Records and the Terrorist Fi-
nance Tracking Program.’ Yearbook of European Law 32.1 (2013): 368-388. 
22  Bauman, Zygmunt, et al. ‘After Snowden: Rethinking the impact of surveillance.’ Inter-
national political sociology 8.2 (2014): 121-144. 
23  C-362/14 Schrems EU:C:2015:650; C-293/12 and C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland and 
Others EU:C:2014:238. 
24  Regulation (EU) 2016/679.  
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the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of 
criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free 
movement of such data applies.25   
 
According to the Commission the Directive for the police and criminal justice 
sector ensures that the data of victims, witnesses, and suspects of crimes, are 
duly protected in the context of a criminal investigation or a law enforcement 
action.26 At the same time more harmonised laws also facilitate cross-border 
cooperation of police or prosecutors to combat crime and terrorism more 
effectively across Europe. It also places very strict limitations on the circum-
stances under which personal data can be shared with a third country (a 
country outside the EU) for the purposes of law enforcement (including of 
course the fight against terrorism and serious transnational crime).27 As this is 
a directive, it must be transposed by the 28 Member States by 6 May 2018. 
Thus the PNR agreements must be accompanied by a Commission decision 
that  the third country or international organisation in question ensures an 
adequate level of protection, where appropriate safeguards have been pro-
vided, or where derogations for specific situations apply. Because these ade-
quacy decisions of the Commission are based on the Commission’s apprecia-
tion of the situation in the third country they can be challenged before the 
CJEU (or the general court).  
                                                  
25  Directive (EU) 2016/680.  
26  http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-6321_en.htm, accessed 19 September 
2017. 
27  Preamble 64 of the Directive 2016/680 gives the rationale ‘Member States should en-
sure that a transfer to a third country or to an international organisation takes place 
only if necessary for the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal 
offences or the execution of criminal penalties, including the safeguarding against and 
the prevention of threats to public security, and that the controller in the third country 
or international organisation is an authority competent within the meaning of this Di-
rective. A transfer should be carried out only by competent authorities acting as con-
trollers, except where processors are explicitly instructed to transfer on behalf of con-
trollers. Such a transfer may take place in cases where the Commission has decided 
that the third country or international organisation in question ensures an adequate 
level of protection, where appropriate safeguards have been provided, or where dero-
gations for specific situations apply. Where personal data are transferred from the Un-
ion to controllers, to processors or to other recipients in third countries or interna-
tional organisations, the level of protection of natural persons provided for in the Un-
ion by this Directive should not be undermined, including in cases of onward transfers 
of personal data from the third country or international organisation to controllers or 
processors in the same or in another third country or international organisation.’ 
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5. EU-Canada PNR Agreement 
In 2006 the EU concluded its first passenger name record agreement with 
Canada. The Agreement expired in September 2009. In 2010 the EU com-
menced negotiations for new PNR agreements with the Australia, Canada 
and the USA. While the agreements with Australia and the US were con-
cluded in 2012, the EU-Canada agreement was only initialled on 6 May 2013 
with the proposal for a Council decision adopting the agreement in July 2013. 
However, on 6 June 2013 the first of the Snowden revelations about the 
NSA’s mass surveillance programme appeared in the Guardian newspaper.28  
First the EDPS issued a negative opinion, then the Council accepted that the 
European Parliament had to approve the decision to conclude the agree-
ment. Although the Council went ahead and signed the agreement in June 
2014 only seeking the Parliament’s approval on 7 July 2014, the Parliament 
was unhappy with the data protection arrangements and sought the opinion 
of the CJEU on 25 November 2014 which was duly handed down on 26 July 
2017.29  
6. The Judgment in a Nutshell 
The CJEU held that the agreement could not be concluded in its (then) cur-
rent form because several of its provisions were incompatible with funda-
mental rights recognised by the EU. As the proposed agreement would per-
mit the systematic and continuous transfer of PNR data on all air passengers 
to the Canadian authorities, use, retention for five years and possible transfer 
to other authorities and to other non EU countries, the CJEU concluded that 
it entailed an interference with the EU fundamental right to respect for pri-
vate life. It also entailed an interference with the EU fundamental right to 
personal data protection. Because there is an interference with two EU fun-
damental rights it must be justified by the pursuit of an objective of general 
interest to be lawful. Further, to be justified the interference must be strictly 
necessary and lay down clear and precise rules. As regards sensitive data 
(covering racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical 
beliefs, trade-union membership or concerning a person’s health or sex life) 
the agreement is inadequate regarding their protection. As regards all other 
PNR data, the objective of identifying risk to public security presented by per-
sons not known to the relevant services justifies automated analysis of PNR 
data for the purposes of border control. Once admitted to Canada, the use of 
PNR data must be subject to different (and presumably more stringent) rules 
                                                  
28  https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon -court-
order accessed 18 September 2017.  
29   Opinion 1/15 ECLI:EU:C:2017:592. 
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which include an a priori review to be carried out by a court or other inde-
pendent administrative authority of the necessity of access to the PNR data 
for the purposes of prevention, detection or prosecution of crime. After de-
parture from Canada, continued storage is no longer strictly necessary in re-
spect of passengers in respect of whom no risk has been identified as regards 
terrorism or serious transnational crime. For those passengers where a risk 
has been identified, then retention and storage for up to five years is permis-
sible but subject to the same stringent requirements as regards access as ap-
ply when the passenger is in Canada.  
The CJEU provides a list of six requirements which the agreement must 
include to fulfil EU data protection obligations (see Annex 1).  
7. Adjudicating Necessity in Preventing, Combating, Repressing and 
Eliminating Terrorism 
When is an interference with the right to respect for privacy and data protec-
tion permissible on the basis of preventing, combating, repressing and elimi-
nating terrorism through the use of border controls? This is the question 
which the CJEU is required to answer.  
The objective and justification for the PNR agreement, according to its 
preamble, is to prevent, combat, repress, and eliminate terrorism and terror-
ist-related offences as well as other serious transnational crime. The agree-
ment sets out the definition of terrorism and terrorist related crimes as well 
as serious transnational crime. Article 5 of the agreement confirms that the 
Canadian Competent Authority is deemed to provide an adequate level of 
protection for the processing and use of PNR data consistent with EU stan-
dards.  
But is it necessary to transfer PNR data for this purpose? The CJEU notes 
that the Commission and the Council have no precise statistics on the basis of 
which to ascertain the contribution which PNR data makes to the prevention 
and detection of crime or terrorism or its investigation.30 However, the CJEU 
notes that third countries and Member States which already use PNR data for 
law enforcement purposes claim that it is essential. The EU proposal (now 
adopted) for an intra EU PNR transfer system31 states that experience of cer-
tain countries (unspecified) shows that the use of PNR data has led to critical 
progress in the fight against drug trafficking, human trafficking and terrorism 
and a better understanding of the composition and operations of terrorist 
and other criminal networks.32 This statement is unchallenged by the CJEU.  
                                                  
30  Paragraph 55 of the judgment. 
31  COM(2011) 32 final.  
32  Paragraph 55 of the judgment.  
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The Canadian authorities, according to the CJEU have done better in pro-
ducing some statistics. 28 million air passengers flew between the EU and 
Canada between April 2014 and March 2015. According to the Canadian au-
thorities PNR data on those passengers made it possible to arrest 178 people 
(though it is not clear on what grounds).33 71 drugs seizures were made, 2 
child pornography cases were identified, and in 169 cases PNR made it possi-
ble to initiate or further pursue investigations in relation to terrorism.34 No 
statistics on trials or convictions were provided.  
As regards the purpose and content of the agreement, the CJEU found 
that there were two objectives, first the prevention etc of terrorism and ter-
rorist related offences and other serious transnational crime and secondly 
the respect for fundamental rights in particular the right to respect for pri-
vate life and the right to the protection of personal data.35 Yet, the transfer of 
PNR data to Canada and its use there is only justified by the objective of en-
suring public security there. Thus such transfer is only lawful if there are rules 
in Canada which guarantee a level of protection which is essentially equiva-
lent to that guaranteed in the EU.36  
As the CJEU found that transfer of PNR data, its use and its subsequent 
transfer to other Canadian authorities, Europol, Eurojust, judicial or police 
authorities of the Member States or the authorities of third countries consti-
tute interferences with the right to respect for privacy (Article 7 EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights)37 it must be justified. The justification must be consis-
tent with the principle of proportionality and strictly necessary to achieve the 
objective.38 The processing of personal data cannot be justified on the basis 
of the consent of the passenger as the passenger provided his or her informa-
tion for reservation purposes (not for transmission to third parties).39 Pre-
sumably this would be the case irrespective of the wording of any consent 
box which the airline required to be ticked before completing the reserva-
tion. The tendency of companies to require consent for use of personal data 
                                                  
33  This rather startling fact which is inherently related to the proportionality of the 
agreement is repeated at paragraph 152 of the judgment but the CJEU chose not to at-
tack the agreement on the ground that there is no proportionality between the num-
ber of persons whose personal data is shared on a systematic and untargeted manner 
and the extremely low number of useful outcomes for the state using the data. 
34  Paragraph 56 of the judgment. 
35  Paragraphs 81 and 84 of the judgment. 
36  Paragraph 93 of the judgment.  
37  Paragraph 125 of the judgment. 
38  Paragraph 140 of the judgment. 
39  Paragraph 143 of the judgment. 
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of those using their services for purposes far beyond what the consumer ex-
pected has been subject of critical judicial consideration.40  
Yet, the objective of fighting terrorism and serious transnational crime is 
a general interest of the EU.41 The transfer of PNR data is appropriate for the 
purpose of ensuring public security and largely facilitates and expedites secu-
rity and border control checks. However, there are a number of limits. First, 
there must be a sufficiently clear and precise definition of the PNR data 
which can be transferred. Mere reference to PNR data as including available 
frequent flyer and benefit information (free tickets, upgrades, etc) is inade-
quate in this regard. The CJEU was particularly unimpressed by the use of 
‘etc’.42 The use of the terms ‘all available contact information’ and ‘all avail-
able payment/billing information’ are similarly inadequate for lack of preci-
sion and clarity in the view of the CJEU. This is also the case regarding the 
reference to ‘all supplementary information’.  
Sensitive data, which includes any information which reveals racial or 
ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade union 
membership a person’s health or sex life, (as defined in the agreement itself) 
while not directly solicited in PNR data may be included in it. The examples 
which are usually put forward relate to choice of meals (Halal, vegetarian, 
Kosher etc) which could be taken as proxies for religious or philosophical be-
liefs. These characteristics, in the absence of regard to the personal conduct 
of the traveller, if processed for the purposes of combating terrorism and 
serious transnational crime would breach EU guarantees in respect of privacy 
and data protection.43 This sensitive data can only be transferred to Canada if 
there are precise and particularly solid justifications.  
The agreement acknowledges that the Canadian authorities will submit 
the systematically collected data which is not targeted in any way to auto-
mated processing based on pre-established models and criteria and cross-
checking with various databases.44 The objective is a risk assessment for the 
purpose of public security (that of Canada not the EU) which automated 
processing is carried out on the basis of unverified personal data necessarily 
presenting the possibility of a margin of error. This is a point which the EDPS 
had stressed in his opinion on the agreement suggesting that evidence indi-
cates that the margin of error appears to be significant. The CJEU rightly fo-
cuses on how the pre-established models and criteria are created. In particu-
                                                  
40  Kosta, Eleni. Consent in European data protection law. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Pub-
lishers 2013. 
41  Paragraph 149 of the judgment. 
42  Paragraph 156 of the judgment. 
43  Paragraph 165 of the judgment. 
44  Paragraph 168 et seq of the judgment. 
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lar as the algorithms which result from these models and criteria must be 
based on something, the concern is whether those criteria are discriminatory 
on prohibited grounds such as race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
social group, political or philosophical opinion, sexual orientation etc. The 
obligation to ensure that the models and criteria result in only those in re-
spect of whom there is a reasonable suspicion of participation in terrorism or 
serious transnational crime is paramount. Further as far as cross checking 
with other databases – those databases must also be reliable, up to date and 
limited to databases used by Canada in relation to the fight against terrorism 
and serious transnational crime. It is worth noting that in a study undertaken 
in four Member States in 2005 — 2007 on the accuracy of information on 
third country nationals submitted by the authorities to the Schengen Infor-
mation System, according to checks by national data protection authorities 
up to 40% was either inaccurate or unlawfully stored.45 One can only hope 
that the Canadian databases are more accurate and in conformity with the 
relevant law.  
The CJEU insisted on a further requirement (specified in the agreement) 
that in respect of automated processing of personal data, where a positive 
result occurs there must be an individual re-examination by non-automated 
means before an individual measure adversely affecting air passengers is 
adopted.46  
The CJEU found that the automated processing of personal data facili-
tates and expedites security checks, in particular at borders.47 It is aimed at 
identifying persons who are not, at that stage, known to the competent au-
thorities and who may potentially present a risk and therefore may be sub-
ject to further examination. The court accepted that the exclusion of certain 
categories of persons or certain areas of origin from the automated process-
ing would be liable to prevent the achievement of the objective which is to 
identify through verification of the data, persons liable to present a public 
security risk. Thus the inclusion of all PNR data without targeting was ac-
cepted. However, as the data processing is for the purposes of border checks 
on unknown risks, once a person has crossed the border the objective has 
been exhausted. The use of data after the passenger has entered Canada 
must be based on new circumstances justifying that use. There must be ob-
jective criteria in order to define the circumstances and conditions under 
which the authorities are authorised to use the data. This must include an a 
priori review by a court or independent administrative body following a rea-
                                                  
45  Brouwer, Evelien. Digital borders and real rights: effective remedies for third-country 
nationals in the Schengen Information System. Leiden: Brill 2008. 
46  Paragraph 173 of the judgment. 
47  Paragraph 187 of the judgment. 
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soned request by the competent authorities to access the data. The objective 
must also be limited to the prevention, detection or prosecution of crime.48  
After departure from Canada the objective of the data processing is fin-
ished at least in respect of persons who were never identified as a security 
risk. Indeed even in respect of those who were identified, the CJEU notes that 
both the Council and the Commission consider that ‘the average lifespan of 
international serious crime networks and the duration and complexity of in-
vestigations relating to those networks, do not justify the continued storage 
of the PNR data of all air passengers after their departure from Canada for 
the purposes of possibly accessing that data, regardless of whether there is 
any link with combating terrorism and serious transnational crime.’49 How-
ever, in specific cases where there is objective evidence that the passenger 
may present a risk in terms of the fight against terrorism and serious transna-
tional crime even after their departure from Canada their specific data can be 
stored for up to five years.50 But the data must always be held in Canada and 
at the end of the retention period all data must be irreversibly destroyed.  
As regards disclosure of PNR data to third countries, the same rules and 
protections must apply as regards its use in Canada (dealing with the US NSA 
issue). Just to make the matter completly clear the CJEU stated that disclo-
sure to a third country requires the existence of either an agreement be-
tween the European Union and the non-member country concerned equiva-
lent to that agreement, or a decision of the Commission, under the relevant 
EU directive finding that the third country ensures an adequate level of pro-
tection within the meaning of EU law and covering the authorities to which it 
is intended PNR data be transferred.51 
While the Opinion does not exclude the bulk collection of data, a disap-
pointment to privacy advocates in Europe, it does place very substantial lim-
its on the use and deletion of data.52 It is a very substantial privacy protective 
decision regarding how personal data can be used where the collection is jus-
tified on the grounds of action against terrorism. 
                                                  
48  Paragraphs 196 et seq of the judgment. 
49  Paragraph 205 of the judgment. 
50  Paragraphs 207 and 209 of the judgment. 
51  Paragraph 214 of the judgment. 
52  See Guild, Elspeth and Kuskonmaz Elif ‘EU Exclusive Jurisdiction on Surveillance related 
to Terrorism and Serious Transnational Crime, Case Review on Opinion 1/15 of the 
CJEU’ European Law Review (forthcoming). 
Guild: Border controls, Surveillance and Counter Terrorism 
16 
8. The US Executive Orders ‘Protecting the Nation from Foreign 
Terrorist Entry into the USA’ 
So far in 2017, the US Government, has issued three executive orders, the 
most recent on 24 September 2017, banning nationals from some countries 
from entering the USA. The objective of the orders is stated to be national 
security and in particular counter-terrorism. The first two bans — Executive 
Orders of 27 January 2017 and 6 March 2017 — focused on nationals of Iran, 
Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen (Iraq was taken off the list in 
March). The Executive Orders have been partially stopped by various Circuit 
Courts (mainly the Hawaii Court, the 4th and  9th Circuits and the Supreme 
Court) and the matter has gone to the Supreme Court for a full hearing (even-
tually). The three travel bans have the same vocation: to require all states to 
provide information regarding their citizens (and those foreigners about 
whom they hold information) to the US authorities in return for being left off 
the banned list. The most recent Travel Ban sets out for the first time the in-
formation which states must provide about their citizens with a three fold 
objective – (a) to confirm the identity of people seeking to enter the USA; (b) 
identification of persons applying for any other benefit under US immigration 
laws and (c) assessment of security or public safety threats. The baseline con-
tains three categories of information: 
(a)  identity-management information; 
(b)  national security and public safety information; 
(c)  national security and public safety risk assessment. 
 
Further specificity is provided in the Travel Ban as follows: 
Identity management information: states must provide to the US authori-
ties information needed by the US to determine whether individuals seeking 
to go or stay in the USA are who they claim to be. This focuses on integrity of 
documents. The criteria are whether the country issues electronic passports 
embedded with data to enable confirmation of identity; reports lost or stolen 
passports to appropriate entities (unspecified); and makes available on (US) 
request identity-related information not included in its passports. This extra 
information is not defined or limited. 
National security and public safety information: the US Government ex-
pects foreign governments to provide information about whether persons 
(seeking to go to the US) pose a national security or public-safety risk (not 
limited to the USA). The criteria are whether the country makes available 
known or suspected terrorist and criminal history information upon request; 
whether the country provides passport and national identity document ex-
emplars; whether the country impedes the US Government’s receipt of in-
formation about passengers and crew traveling to the USA (this is a reference 
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to Passenger Name Records held by airlines). This category might cover new 
Regulation 2017/458 on databases and EU external frontiers to catch EU na-
tional ‘foreign’ fighters. 
National security and public safety risk assessment: this category focuses 
on national security risk indicators. The criteria are: whether the country is a 
known or potential terrorist safe haven; whether it is a participant in the Visa 
Waiver Program; whether it regularly fails to receive its nationals subject to 
final orders of removal from the USA. 
 
The US authorities’ stated objective is the collection of personal data from 
states in pursuit of national security (in particular counter terrorism) objec-
tives of the US. Particularly in the first Executive Order, the counter-terrorism 
objective was stated without any apparent justification that the states listed 
in the banning order and their citizens are specifically linked with a terrorism 
threat to the USA. This issue was raised before the US court and while the 
litigation is far from finished, the US 9th Circuit Appeals Court has challenged 
the US government’s claim that national security (and counter-terrorism as 
part of it) is an overriding interest which trumps all other claims. 
9. The US 9th Circuit Appeals Court Washington and Minnesota v 
Trump 9 February 201753 
Normally, US courts have been reluctant to challenge claims by the executive 
that measures are required on the grounds of national security. However, the 
executive orders banning nationals of certain states from entry into the US 
has caused the 9th Circuit Appeals Court in particular to question this assump-
tion. The court considered the US Governments argument that its national 
security claim should not be subject to judicial consideration. The court held 
that ‘the Government’s rote invocation of harm to ‘national security inter-
ests’ as the silver bullet that defeats all other asserted injuries’ is not convinc-
ing (page 74). Relying on previous authority, it held that with national secu-
rity may be the most compelling of government interest it does not mean 
that it will always tip the balance of equities in favour of the government. The 
court’s obligation to uphold the constitution means that it must examine 
whether the state’s claim of harm to national security still outweighs the 
competing claim of injury. The court found in favour of the competing claim 
of injury on the basis of a claim grounds in the US constitution (to natural and 
legal persons in the USA). The willingness of the court toexamine and reject 
the states justification of action at the border on the grounds of counter-
                                                  
53  State of Washington and State of Minnesota v. Trump, No. 2:17-cv-00141 (W.D.Wash. 
2017). 
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terrorism (national security) is the aspect of interest here. The reasoning 
based on the US constitutional right of people to enjoy the presence of for-
eigners close to them is quite different from that of the CJEU (privacy and 
data protection). But in both cases the claims of counter-terrorism and na-
tional security have been questioned, examined and found insufficient. 
10. Conclusions 
Border controls provide particular opportunities for states to collect vast 
amounts of data about people travelling. The justification for the collection of 
personal data in the context of border controls used in the EU and the USA 
has been national security in particular in the form of counter-terrorism. The 
measures taken include requiring the private sector travel industry to divulge 
all the personal data they hold on passengers they carry across borders and 
requiring state authorities to provide all information including suspicions they 
have about their own citizens in the context of counter-terrorism.  
In both cases courts in the EU and the USA have begun to ask questions 
about the legitimacy of these personal data collection projects. While the 
grounds have been very different the outcomes challenge the state authori-
ties claims that counter-terrorism is (using the words of the US 9th Circuit Ap-
peals Court) a silver bullet which outweighs all other considerations. 
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Annex 1 Opinion 1/15 
IX. Answer to the request for an Opinion 
 
232 In the light of all the foregoing considerations, it must be held that: 
… 
(3) the envisaged agreement must, in order to be compatible with Articles 7 
and 8 and Article 52(1) of the Charter: 
(a) determine in a clear and precise manner the PNR data to be trans-
ferred from the European Union to Canada; 
(b) provide that the models and criteria used in the context of automat-
ed processing of PNR data will be specific and reliable and non-
discriminatory; provide that the databases used will be limited to 
those used by Canada in relation to the fight against terrorism and 
serious transnational crime; 
(c) save in the context of verifications in relation to the pre-established 
models and criteria on which automated processing of PNR data is 
based, make the use of that data by the Canadian Competent Author-
ity during the air passengers’ stay in Canada and after their departure 
from that country, and any disclosure of that data to other authori-
ties, subject to substantive and procedural conditions based on ob-
jective criteria; make that use and that disclosure, except in cases of 
validly established urgency, subject to a prior review carried out ei-
ther by a court or by an independent administrative body, the deci-
sion of that court or body authorising the use being made following a 
reasoned request by those authorities, inter alia, within the frame-
work of procedures for the prevention, detection or prosecution of 
crime; 
(d) limit the retention of PNR data after the air passengers’ departure to 
that of passengers in respect of whom there is objective evidence 
from which it may be inferred that they may present a risk in terms 
of the fight against terrorism and serious transnational crime; 
(e) make the disclosure of PNR data by the Canadian Competent Author-
ity to the government authorities of a third country subject to the 
condition that there be either an agreement between the European 
Union and that third country equivalent to the envisaged agreement, 
or a decision of the Commission, under Article 25(6) of Directive 
95/46, covering the authorities to which it is intended that PNR data 
be disclosed; 
(f) provide for a right to individual notification for air passengers in the 
event of use of PNR data concerning them during their stay in Canada 
and after their departure from that country, and in the event of dis-
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closure of that data by the Canadian Competent Authority to other 
authorities or to individuals; and 
(g) guarantee that the oversight of the rules laid down in the envisaged 
agreement relating to the protection of air passengers with regard to 
the processing of PNR data concerning them will be carried out by an 
independent supervisory authority. 
 
